Cleveland's Costly QB Graveyard: A History of Wasted Assets
Source: Yard Barker. Casualplayhub News adds summary, context, and editorial framing while linking back to the original report.
The Cleveland Browns made a decision this week that officially sealed the fate of what many are calling the NFL's most depressing quarterback competition. Deshaun Watson will be the Week 1 starter—a move that feels less like a triumph and more like a grim acknowledgment of the team's long, painful search for a reliable signal-caller. The preseason only deepened the gloom: Watson was booed off the field during a lackluster performance, then turned around and called out fans for expressing their perfectly reasonable displeasure with everything about the franchise, especially its quarterback room.
That quarterback room is a monument to failed investment. Since the start of the 2022 season, the Browns have thrown an extraordinary amount of draft capital and money at the position, yet they remain one of the league's worst teams. To understand the scale of the disaster, consider the assets they've committed to quarterbacks in just four years.
It began with the blockbuster trade for Watson in 2022. Cleveland sent the Houston Texans three first-round picks, a third-round pick, and two fourth-round picks. They then signed Watson to a fully guaranteed $230 million contract—a deal that has quickly become one of the worst in NFL history. Some of those traded picks were later used by other teams to select players like Jordan Davis, Jahmyr Gibbs, and Brian Thomas Jr., adding salt to the wound.
The following year, the Browns used a 2023 fifth-round pick on Dorian Thompson-Robinson. In 2024, they traded Thompson-Robinson and a 2025 fifth-round pick to the Philadelphia Eagles for Kenny Pickett. That same year, they used two selections in the 2025 draft on quarterbacks: Dillon Gabriel in the third round and Shedeur Sanders in the fifth. Then, in the 2026 draft, they used a sixth-round pick on Taylen Green.
Count them up: three first-round picks, two third-round picks, two fourth-round picks, three fifth-round picks, and a sixth-round pick—all used to acquire six different quarterbacks via draft or trade. The return on this massive investment? A 26-42 record over that span. Cleveland's quarterbacks have combined for a 74.2 passer rating, the lowest in the NFL. Only the New York Jets (with a rating under 80) come close to matching that futility.
The situation becomes even more damning when you zoom in on Watson. He hasn't been an effective starter in nearly six years. His last 300-yard passing game came in Week 17 of the 2020 season. Since then, there have been 462 instances of a quarterback throwing for at least 300 yards in a single game, involving 65 different quarterbacks. Shedeur Sanders is one of them. Watson is not. The Browns' own quarterbacks who have achieved that feat since Watson's last 300-yard game include Joe Flacco (four times), Jameis Winston (three times), Baker Mayfield (twice), Jacoby Brissett (once), and Sanders (once).
Perhaps the most baffling part of the story is that Gabriel, a third-round pick (No. 94 overall) just one year ago—selected two rounds before Sanders—didn't seem to be a serious candidate for the starting job this year. It's a staggering indictment of the team's scouting, player development, and overall decision-making.
The Browns have created a quarterback graveyard, littered with wasted picks and bloated contracts. As they prepare for another season, likely near the bottom of the league, they may soon invest another premium pick in a quarterback. History suggests that outcome will be no different.
Article commentary
The Cleveland Browns' quarterback saga is a textbook case of how not to build a franchise. The team's relentless pursuit of a solution at the game's most important position has been marked by a series of increasingly desperate moves, each compounding the last. The results are not just poor—they are historically bad. What stands out most is the sheer volume of assets poured into the quarterback room with almost no return. Since 2022, the Browns have used ten draft picks across four drafts to acquire or trade for six quarterbacks. That's an average of more than two picks per year for a single position. For context, most teams consider themselves fortunate to land one franchise quarterback in a decade. Cleveland has thrown darts at the board and missed every time. The Deshaun Watson trade remains the centerpiece of this failure. Giving up three first-round picks and a fully guaranteed $230 million contract for a player who would go on to miss significant time and perform below replacement level was a gamble that has backfired catastrophically. The contract, in particular, has hamstrung the team's cap flexibility, making it nearly impossible to build a competitive roster around him. But the blame doesn't fall solely on the front office's decision to acquire Watson. The subsequent moves—drafting Dorian Thompson-Robinson, trading for Kenny Pickett, spending a third-round pick on Dillon Gabriel, and a fifth-rounder on Shedeur Sanders—all suggest a scouting department that consistently misjudges talent. The fact that Gabriel, a third-round pick, wasn't even seriously considered for the starting job just one year after being drafted is a damning indictment of the evaluation process. From a strategic standpoint, the Browns' approach highlights a fundamental misunderstanding of NFL roster construction. The league's most successful teams—like the Chiefs, Bills, and Packers—tend to build a stable foundation before investing heavily in a quarterback. Cleveland has done the opposite: they've chased the quarterback first, then tried to patch the rest of the roster. The result is a team that is neither competitive nor positioned for a rebuild. Objectively, the Browns have the worst quarterback room in the NFL by almost any metric. Their collective passer rating of 74.2 over the last four years is a full 10 points below the league average. They have won only 38% of their games in that span. The only other team with a passer rating under 80 is the Jets, who have at least shown signs of life with a young quarterback on a rookie contract. Cleveland has no such hope. Looking ahead, the Browns are likely to be picking high in the 2027 draft, and they will almost certainly consider taking a quarterback. But the track record suggests that no matter who they draft, the systemic issues in scouting, development, and front-office decision-making will persist. Until the organization fundamentally changes its approach, the quarterback graveyard will continue to grow.